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Standing and Contracts
F. Andrew Hessick*
ABSTRACT
In Spokeo v. Robbins, the Supreme Court held that, to establish Article
III standing to bring suit in federal court, a plaintiff cannot simply allege the
violation of a legal right. Instead, the plaintiff must allege an injury in fact.
Although it addressed standing to bring suit for statutory violations, Spokeo
raises serious questions about limits on the ability to bring breach of contract
actions in federal court. After all, contracts simply create legal rights. Under
Spokeo’s logic, the breach of contractual rights should not support standing;
instead, standing exists only if the breach results in factual harm. But restricting standing in this way would significantly curtail freedom of contract and
would render many traditionally enforceable contracts unenforceable in federal court. At the same time, creating an exception to the injury in fact rule for
contract law would create anomalies that would threaten to destabilize standing law. The difficulties with each of those approaches casts serious doubt on
Spokeo’s holding that the violation of a legal right does not support standing.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans enter into thousands of contracts each year. Underlying every purchase and every payment for service is a contract. Enforcing these contracts is one of the principal functions of the courts.1
Each year, courts resolve thousands of contract disputes.2
Increasingly, contracts today involve online transactions. Those
online transactions raise new privacy concerns. People send their personal information and credit card numbers over the web and vendors
often keep that information on their servers. Smart devices gather information about individuals. As a result, many contracts contain provisions relating to data protection and privacy, and we should expect
those types of contracts only to grow.
These privacy provisions highlight an interesting jurisdictional
problem for federal courts. One would think that, so long as there is
diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the breach of one of those
provisions constitutes a case appropriately brought in federal court.
But that is not obviously so. The problem is one of standing.
Deriving from the “case” or “controversy” provision in Article
III, standing defines who can bring suit in federal court. The precise
test for standing has varied over time. Traditionally, individuals could
bring suit if they suffered the invasion of a legal right. But in the
1970s, the Court began shifting the standing inquiry from whether a
person suffered an invasion of a legal right to whether the plaintiff
suffered a factual injury, such as the loss of money or physical harm.
In 2016, the Court completed the shift, declaring in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins3 that a plaintiff must show a “concrete” factual injury to estab1 See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he usual and most
important function of courts of justice is . . . to maintain and enforce contracts.”). Although
enforcing contracts may no longer be the main business of the federal courts, it continues to be
important today. See U.S. District Courts–Judicial Business 2018, UNITED STATES COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2018 [https://
perma.cc/K9TT-XFKG] (reporting 26,768 new contract actions in federal court in 2018).
2 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, over 3,000 contract cases were decided by
jury in 2005, and many others decided by a bench trial. Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil
Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (Oct. 2008), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEJ2-9KH9]. These statistics do not
capture the number of contract disputes resolved by summary judgment or other pre-trial
motion.
3 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

R
R
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lish standing; the violation of a legal right, the Court held, does not
provide a basis for standing.4
Following Spokeo, lower courts have denied standing to individuals claiming violations of various statutory rights, even when those
statutes explicitly authorize private actions to enforce those rights. For
example, although the Privacy Act confers a right to have federal
agencies follow various procedures to protect information about individuals, the Fourth Circuit held in Beck v. McDonald5 that violating
this right by failing to follow those procedures is not a basis for standing.6 Instead, a plaintiff must show that he suffered some additional
factual harm from the violation, like the actual theft of his identity,
because of the agency’s misconduct.7
But the logic of Spokeo is not limited to statutory violations. It
also extends to contracts. Contracts simply create legal rights. A person can demand the consideration specified in a contract because the
contract creates a legal entitlement to that consideration. Just as the
violation of statutory rights need not cause concrete factual harms, the
violation of contractual rights need not cause concrete injury.
Spokeo’s reasoning strongly suggests that victims of breaches that do
not cause concrete factual harm do not have standing to vindicate
their contractual rights. Instead, they must establish a concrete injury
resulting from the breach of contract.
That conclusion would significantly affect the enforceability of
contracts in federal courts. For example, following the Fourth Circuit’s
logic in Beck, if a person enters into a contract requiring an agency to
follow procedures comparable to those prescribed by the Privacy Act,
that person should not have standing to sue for breach of contract if
the agency fails to follow those procedures. The effect would not be
limited to contracts involving data privacy. Many breaches of contract
do not result in a concrete injury in fact. For example, suppose Paul
contracts with Dan to pay $1,000 for a share of stock, Dan breaches,
and Jeff immediately offers to sell Paul a share of the same stock for
$20. Or to take a more famous example: suppose a builder installs a
pipe made by a manufacturer different from the one specified in a
contract, yet the installed pipe is indistinguishable from the one called
for by the contract and in any event will not be seen because it is
4 Id. at 1549 (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
statutory violation.”).
5 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
6 See id. at 277.
7 See id.
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inside the walls.8 The plaintiff in neither example suffers a concrete
factual harm from the breach. By Spokeo’s logic, neither plaintiff
should have standing.
Since it was decided, Spokeo has faced criticism. Critics have argued that Spokeo is unworkably incoherent,9 introduces undesirable
normative judgments into jurisdictional determinations,10 does not advance the separation of powers principles underlying standing,11 and
conflicts with the original understanding of Article III.12 None of these
criticisms, however, has focused on the effect that Spokeo has on the
enforceability of contracts. By the language and logic of Spokeo, the
injury in fact requirement should apply equally to contracts, and the
repercussions of doing so provides a compelling argument for discarding that requirement.
Requiring an injury in fact to support standing for breach of contract has several undesirable consequences. It would limit freedom of
contract by restricting the enforceability of rights that parties create
through contracts.13 Contract provisions designating federal courts as
the appropriate forum for breach actions would be unenforceable if
the consequence of the breach does not result in a cognizable factual
injury. Requiring injury in fact could also generate disparity in the
enforceability of contract rights in federal and state courts—thereby
undermining one of the principal reasons for extending diversity juris8

Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).

See, e.g., William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197,
227 (“The way to make [Spokeo] coherent is to say that only injuries recognized in some form by
the common law will suffice. But this is a position that the Court has (rightly) rejected.”); Daniel
Solove, Response, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: When Is a Person Harmed by a Privacy Violation?,
GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (May 18, 2016), https://www.gwlr.org/spokeo-inc-v-robins-when-is-a-person-harmed-by-a-privacy-violation [https://perma.cc/JYQ5-T3MH] (describing
Spokeo as “an M.C. Escher painting . . . sending the reader around and around in impossible
loops”).
9

10 See Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2285, 2370 (2018) (“[T]he inquiry into whether harm is concrete invites courts to make contestable judgments . . . .”).
11 See Leading Cases, Justiciability—Class Action Standing—Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 130
HARV. L. REV. 437, 442 (2016) (“[I]t is difficult to see how Spokeo serves standing doctrine’s
broader principles . . . .”).
12 See F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV.
673, 702 (2017) (arguing that the injury in fact requirement is ahistorical for suits alleging violations of private rights).
13 See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (“Legal obligations that
exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the
grasp.”); see also Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943
(2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[A] right without any remedy is a meaningless scholasticism . . . .”).
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diction to the federal courts.14 State courts that do not have an injury
in fact requirement could hear breach claims that federal courts could
not hear.15
At the same time, creating a “contracts exception” to Spokeo by
dispensing with the injury in fact requirement for contract actions
would create significant anomalies in standing law. It would give priority to contract rights over rights deriving from other legal sources,
such as statutes and constitutions. Perhaps more important, recognizing standing for breach of contract actions would provide a means for
avoiding the injury in fact requirement in other types of cases. Injury
in fact would no longer be an absolute threshold prerequisite to suing
in federal court; instead, injury in fact would become a default rule.
Many parties could circumvent standing limitations on statutory rights
by entering into contracts imposing obligations identical to those in
statutes. Likewise, it would provide a means for Congress and state
legislatures to circumvent the injury in fact requirement for statutory
rights. The law has long recognized that statutes can create implied
contracts.16 Legislatures could simply designate legal rights created by
statute as obligations imposed by an implied contract.
The inability to square Spokeo with contracts provides a compelling argument that Spokeo was wrongly decided. Faithfully following
its language and logic would prevent federal courts from fulfilling
their function of enforcing legally valid contracts. Large swaths of contracts that contain provisions aimed at protecting privacy or provisions
conferring rights idiosyncratically valued by the parties would not be
vindicated in federal court. This cannot be right. When a person sues
to vindicate a contract right, standing should not depend on whether
the breach of contract caused an injury in fact. The violation of the
contractual right alone should suffice to support standing. Generalizing this principle from contracts to other areas of the law provides
strong support for the argument that the violation of a legal right
should suffice to support standing.17
14 See F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57,
81–82, 86 (2014) (explaining that, because the primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to
provide an alternative forum to resolve state law claims, “one of the assumptions underlying
diversity jurisdiction is that the enforceability of state rights should not depend on whether a suit
is brought in state or federal court”).
15 Many states have standing rules that differ from the Article III standing rules. See id. at
65–68 (documenting the range of standing tests in the states).
16 See, e.g., Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U.S. 602, 613 (1904) (describing “a liability created by the
statute, because the statute is the foundation for the implied contract”).
17 Commentators have argued that the violation of a legal right alone should support
standing. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the development of standing doctrine. As it explains, the original test for standing was whether litigants asserted their private rights.
In the 1970s, the Court began shifting the standing inquiry away from
whether the plaintiff asserted a legal right to whether the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact. This shift culminated in Spokeo, which held
that the violation of a legal right unaccompanied by factual harm is
not a basis for standing. Part II argues that the logic of Spokeo applies
to contracts. It explains that contracts simply create legal rights.
Under Spokeo, breaches of contract are not sufficient to support
standing; only breaches that result in some additional factual harm
will suffice. Part III addresses various arguments for why Spokeo’s rationale might not extend to contract actions, and ultimately concludes
that none justifies exempting contracts from Spokeo’s holding. Part IV
discusses the ramifications of the argument in Parts II and III that
Spokeo’s logic applies to contracts. Applying the injury in fact requirement to contracts would have several significant, unwelcome effects
on contract law. At the same time, excluding contracts from the injury
in fact requirement would create anomalies that would destabilize all
of standing law. Instead of navigating this Scylla and Charybdis, the
best course is to overturn Spokeo.
I. ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power
to resolving “Cases” and “Controversies.”18 The Constitution leaves
those terms undefined, and the records of the Constitutional Convention provide little clarification.19 Through a common-law-like process,
the Court has developed various doctrines implementing those
terms.20 One of these doctrines is standing.
REV. 275, 278 (2008) (arguing that “injury in fact is superfluous in private rights cases” because
the violation of the right alone should suffice); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization
of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988) (“For purposes of standing, the principal
question should be whether Congress has created a cause of action . . . .”); William A. Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (“The essence of a true standing question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial enforcement of an asserted
legal duty?”). But they have not focused on private transactions to support that argument. Instead, they have relied on history and the separation of powers.
18

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (recounting James Madison’s statement that it was “generally supposed that the jurisdiction given” in Article III “was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature”).
19

20

See Hessick, supra note 14, at 62 (“[T]he Court has provided meanings to those terms

R
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Originally, standing doctrine required private individuals to establish that their legal rights had been violated.21 In the 1970s, the
Court began to shift the standing inquiry from whether the plaintiff’s
legal rights had been violated to whether the plaintiff had suffered a
factual injury.22 The Court completed that shift in its 2016 decision in
Spokeo. Spokeo held that the violation of a statutory right does not
provide a basis for standing; instead, the violation of a statutory right
supports standing only if the violation results in a factual injury.23 Relying on Spokeo, lower courts have denied standing to individuals who
have alleged violations of a variety of different statutory rights but
have failed to show some additional factual harm that resulted from
the violation.24
A. The Development of the Injury in Fact Test
Under current standing law, a plaintiff seeking to bring suit in
federal court must demonstrate that he has suffered “injury in fact,”
that the injury is “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will “likely . . . be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’”25 According to the Court, this injury in fact test is critical
to maintaining the separation of powers.26 By the Court’s lights, the
injury in fact requirement limits the federal judiciary to its traditional
role of adjudicating the rights of individuals, and it avoids embroiling
the federal courts in disputes more appropriately addressed by Congress or the Executive.27
on a case-by-case basis through a common-law-like process that focuses on the appropriate role
of the judiciary in the federal system.”).
21 See, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939) (denying standing based on factual injury, stating that standing requires invasion of “legal right”).
22 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)
(stating that standing turns on “whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise”).
23 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
24 See, e.g., Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding no standing
under Spokeo for violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act).
25 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38–43 (1976)) (explaining that
the constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: (1) an injury in fact (2) that is
both fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions and (3) that a favorable decision will redress);
accord Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
26 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers
principles . . . .”).
27 See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (“The law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent
the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”); Warth v.
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Despite the Court’s claim that the requirement is essential to preserving the separation of powers, the injury in fact test has not always
been the standard for establishing standing. Traditionally, standing
turned on whether the plaintiff had alleged the invasion of a personal
right, be it one conferred by common law, statute, or the Constitution.28 The mere assertion of a factual injury was insufficient. In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,29 for
example, several power companies sued to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority from generating or selling energy, alleging that they
were harmed by the increased competition.30 The Court denied standing.31 It explained that the harm of revenue loss from competition did
not support standing; rather, standing required the invasion of a “legal
right.”32 By contrast, federal courts followed the ancient common law
rule that individuals could maintain actions for legal violations that
did not result in factual harm.33 As the Court said in Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, “[w]here . . . there has been a violation of a right, the
person injured is entitled to an action.”34
The Court first adopted the injury in fact requirement in the 1970
decision of Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[Standing] is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”).
28 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 159 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
29 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
30 Id. at 134–36.
31 Id. at 147.
32 See id. at 137–38; see also L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295, 304 (1940)
(denying standing to food buyers and sellers who sought to challenge a railroad extension that
would benefit competitors); Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (“[I]njury, legally
speaking, consists of a wrong done to a person, or, in other words, a violation of his right. It is an
ancient maxim, that a damage to one, without an injury in this sense, (damnum absque injuria),
does not lay the foundation of an action; because, if the act complained of does not violate any
of his legal rights, it is obvious, that he has no cause to complain.” (quoting Parker v. Griswold,
17 Conn. 288, 302–03 (1845))); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249,
254–55 (1930) (denying standing to shippers who suffered competitive harm because no “independent right” of the plaintiffs had been violated). Although those cases were decided on standing grounds, the plaintiffs in those cases would have standing today under the injury in fact test
adopted in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Their failure to allege a legal injury, however, would have resulted in a dismissal on the merits
for failure to state a claim.
33 See Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,322)
(Story, Circuit Justice); Parker, 17 Conn. at 304 (“The principle that every injury legally imports
damage, was decisively settled, in the case of Ashby v. White . . . .”); see also Hessick, supra note
17, at 284 (“Early American law adopted the English rule that the violation of every right carried
a remedy.”).
34 302 U.S. at 479 (quoting Parker, 17 Conn. at 302–03).

R
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Camp.35 There, the Court said that standing does not require the
plaintiff to allege the violation of a legal right.36 Instead, the Court
said, standing turns on whether the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact,
economic or otherwise.”37 The injury in fact test was adopted not simply to shift the set of people who had standing by extending standing
to some individuals who previously lacked it while removing it from
others who previously had standing. Instead, the Court explained two
years later, the doctrinal change “broaden[ed] the categories of injury
that may be alleged in support of standing.”38 Thus, under the original
injury in fact test, standing could rest on either the violation of a legal
right or a factual injury.39
But with the shift to the injury in fact test, the Court did not state
that legal injuries and factual injuries were distinct bases for standing.40 Instead, the Court stated that injuries in fact were the only basis
for standing,41 and it described violations of legal rights as injuries in
fact.42 An example is Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.43 There, a
See 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
See id. at 153.
37 Id. at 152.
38 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 616–17 (1973) (stating that the adoption of the injury in fact test “expanded the types
of ‘personal stake[s]’ which are capable of conferring standing on a potential plaintiff” (alteration in original) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970))).
39 See, e.g., Morton, 405 U.S. at 732 (declaring that standing could rest either on a “specific
statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process” or on a “personal stake in the outcome”
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 (“[W]e have
steadfastly adhered to the requirement that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the
putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
40 See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988) (“To bring a cause of
action in federal court requires that plaintiffs establish at an irreducible minimum an injury in
fact . . . .”); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) (stating
that to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he has “suffered some injury-in-fact, adequate to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement”).
41 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 397 U.S. at 152 (“The first question is whether the
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (“The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives,
liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can
show ‘injury in fact’ resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.”);
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3, 624 (“When a person or entity seeks standing to advance
the constitutional rights of others, we ask two questions: first, has the litigant suffered some
injury-in-fact, adequate to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (denying standing for plaintiff who was “not able to assert an
injury in fact”).
42 See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982) (basing standing
on the violation of the “statutorily created right to truthful housing information”); Warth v.
35
36
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black woman sued a real estate company after she allegedly received
false information about the availability of housing.44 She relied on the
Fair Housing Act, which makes it unlawful to misrepresent to any person because of that person’s race that an apartment is not available
for sale or rental,45 and which confers a private cause of action to enforce this prohibition.46 Although the plaintiff did not intend to rent
the apartment, the Court held that she had standing.47 It explained
that Article III requires “injury in fact,”48 but the “injury required by
Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing.’”49 Accordingly, the Court held,
the alleged violation of the “statutorily created right to truthful housing information” sufficed for the plaintiff’s standing.50
This conflation of factual and legal injuries made little sense. Factual injuries are distinct from legal injuries. The former describes
harms to real world interests; the latter encompasses violations of intangible legal entitlements. A factual harm need not involve a violation of a legal right.51 A person who accidentally trips on someone
else’s steps has suffered a factual harm but not a legal injury. And a
person who owns property onto which someone briefly steps in a way
that causes no damage has suffered a legal harm but no factual injury.52 Over time the failure to list legal injuries as an independent
basis for standing led to a doctrinal shift. Today, legal injuries alone
are not a basis for standing; to establish standing, a plaintiff must allege a factual injury.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (stating that the injury for standing can arise from the violation
of a right); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 & n.2 (1974) (same); Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65
n.17 (“The Illinois Legislature . . . has the power to create new interests, the invasion of which
may confer standing. In such a case, the requirements of Art. III may be met.”); Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976) (recognizing “Congress’ power to create new
interests the invasion of which will confer standing”); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3 (“Congress
may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no
injury would exist without the statute.”).
43

455 U.S. 363 (1982).

44

Id. at 368.

45

42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).

46

Id. § 3612(a).

47

Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74.

48

Id. at 372 (noting “the Art. III minima of injury in fact”).

49

Id. at 373 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).

50

Id. at 373–74.

See Hessick, supra note 17, at 307 (drawing the distinction between factual harm and
legal harm).
51

52

See id. at 282–84 (discussing nominal damages and standing).
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The shift began in the 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.53 Under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), federal agencies
must consult with the Secretary of the Interior before taking actions
that might threaten endangered species.54 At issue in Lujan was a rule
promulgated by the Department of the Interior that exempted agencies from this consultation requirement for actions affecting animals in
foreign countries.55 A group of concerned citizens challenged this rule,
arguing that the ESA conferred on them the right to have the government follow consultation procedures for actions affecting animals in
foreign countries.56 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.57 It explained that, even if the ESA did confer that right, the violation of that right alone did not support standing.58 Instead, the Court
said, standing required the plaintiff to establish a factual harm resulting from the statutory violation.59 In so holding, the Court distinguished past cases such as Havens that based standing on the
violations of statutory rights, claiming that standing in those cases was
appropriate because the plaintiffs had alleged “de facto” injuries that
were judicially cognizable only because of the statutes they invoked.60
In so concluding, the Lujan Court did not say that standing requires proof of injury in fact instead of the violation of a right. Instead, it stated that the injury in fact requirement is necessary to
protect the separation of powers by ensuring that the judiciary stays
within its “province of . . . decid[ing] on the rights of individuals.”61
Thus, under Lujan, the injury in fact requirement operated as a proxy
for determining whether plaintiffs allege their own rights.62
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
55 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58; 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991).
56 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
57 Id. at 578.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Id. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
62 Following Lujan, the Court remained inconsistent about whether the violation of a legal
right could support standing. For example, in FEC v. Akins, the Court found standing for plaintiffs seeking relief under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 524 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1998).
The Act requires certain groups to disclose information about campaign involvement and creates
a private cause of action for “[a]ny person who believes a violation of th[e] Act . . . has occurred.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). In so finding, the Court did not focus on the violation of the
statutory right; instead, it concluded that standing rested on the factual injury of the failure to
provide the information required by the plaintiffs. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (concluding that the
plaintiffs had suffered injury because they were deprived of information that would have been
useful “to evaluate candidates for public office” and “to evaluate the role” that the financial
assistance to candidates “might play in a specific election”). But it is clear that the violation of
53
54
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Lujan involved a suit against the government, and the opinion
limited the factual injury requirement to suits against the government.63 And after Lujan, not all federal courts treated injury in fact as
a prerequisite to standing in other types of suits. Instead, some courts
continued to recognize violations of legal rights as a basis for standing
in suits against non-government parties.64
But in the 2016 decision Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court extended the injury in fact requirement to all suits.65 It held that the
violation of a right does not suffice for Article III standing to sue a
private individual. Instead, the plaintiff must establish that he has suffered, or will suffer, a “concrete,” “real” injury.66
Spokeo involved a suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”).67 That Act requires consumer credit reporting agencies—
agencies that gather and provide information about consumers—to
take reasonable measures to ensure that the information they provide
is accurate.68 The Act also confers a private right of action against
reporting agencies that fail to comply with this requirement,69 entitling
the victim to recover either actual damages or statutory damages of up
to $1,000.70 Invoking this provision, Thomas Robins sued Spokeo,
which operates a website that provides information about people,
claiming that the information on its site about him was inaccurate.71
According to Robins, these inaccuracies were attributable to Spokeo’s
failure to take reasonable measures to ensure the accuracy of informathe statutory right was critical to the standing conclusion. United States v. Richardson, in which
the Court concluded that the failure to provide information requested by plaintiffs about CIA
expenditures did not constitute injury in fact, had established that the failure to provide information demanded by individuals does not, by itself, establish an injury in fact that supports standing. 418 U.S. 166, 167–68, 179 (1974). The Akins plaintiffs could claim injury only because the
statute gave them a right to that information. See Hessick, supra note 17, at 302 (“The plaintiffs
could claim injury only because the statute gave them a right to that information.”).
63 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (“[I]t is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the
concrete injury requirement must remain.”).
64 See, e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The injury
required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.’ ” (quoting Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d
614, 618–19 (9th Cir. 2008))); Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.”), vacated,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
65 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1545.
68 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
69 Id. § 1681n(a).
70 Id.
71 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
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tion.72 The Court held that this violation of FCRA did not provide a
basis for standing.73 According to the Court, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”74
Thus, Robins had to point to a “concrete” harm resulting from that
violation, such as the loss of income or damage to his reputation.75 In
other words, even if a person’s statutory right has been violated, that
person does not have standing to maintain an action to vindicate that
right—unless the violation of the right caused him some other factual
harm that resulted from the violation of the right, such as the loss of
money.
Although it held that violations of statutory rights alone cannot
support standing, the Spokeo Court acknowledged that a factual injury need not be tangible to support standing.76 Thus, for example, it
noted that deprivations of free speech and interference with the free
exercise of religion can form the basis for standing.77 According to the
Court, whether an intangible injury can support standing turns on two
considerations. First, explaining that standing doctrine seeks to limit
federal courts to adjudicating disputes historically resolved by courts,
the Court stated that an intangible injury can support standing if it is
comparable to a harm that traditionally was the basis for a lawsuit.78
Second, the Court stated that Congress can by statute authorize standing for an intangible, concrete harm that would otherwise not support
standing.79 In so stating, however, the Court reiterated that the deprivation of a right alone does not support standing because it is insufficiently concrete.80 Thus, the Court said, even though FCRA requires
companies to follow procedures to ensure the accuracy of information,
the failure to follow those procedures does not support standing if the
failure to do so caused no financial or other factual harm.81
Id.
Id. at 1550.
74 Id. at 1549.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (free speech); Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (free exercise)).
78 Id. at 1549.
79 Id. (“[B]ecause Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also instructive and important. Thus, we said in
Lujan that Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto
injuries that were previously inadequate in law’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992))).
80 Id. (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.”).
81 Id. at 1550.
72
73
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B. Standing after Spokeo
Following Spokeo, lower courts have rejected standing for individuals who have alleged the violation of statutory rights. Many of
these decisions involve laws aimed at protecting privacy. The Second
Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Donna Karan Co.82 provides an example.
At issue in that case was the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act.83 That Act aims to prevent identity theft by prohibiting businesses from printing more than the last five digits of credit card numbers on receipts, and it confers private actions to enforce this
prohibition.84 In Katz, a customer sued Donna Karan under this provision for printing the first six digits of his credit card number on his
receipt.85 The Second Circuit held that the customer lacked standing
because he failed to allege stolen identity or other “concrete” harm
from Donna Karan’s illegal acts.86
The Fourth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in Beck v.
McDonald.87 There, veterans sued a veterans clinic for violating the
Privacy Act.88 That Act requires federal agencies to follow various
procedures in maintaining records on individuals, and it also authorizes private actions.89 According to the veterans, the VA violated this
provision when a VA laptop with personal information was stolen.90
The Fourth Circuit held that the veterans lacked standing.91 It explained that the veterans had not established an injury in fact because
they had shown neither an impending threat of identity theft nor a
justification for bearing the costs of preventing identity theft.92
A third example comes from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,93 which held that a cable subscriber lacked standing to sue for violations of his rights under the
872 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 116.
84 Id. at 117.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 121.
87 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
88 Id. at 266.
89 The Privacy Act authorizes relief only if a person suffers an “adverse effect” because of
the agency’s failure to follow those procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). That provision appears
to require an individual to establish injury in fact for relief. But the Fourth Circuit did not decide
the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Privacy Act. Instead, it held that the
plaintiff lacked standing because they had not established injury in fact. Beck, 848 F.3d at
276–77.
90 Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
91 Id. at 277.
92 See id. at 276–77.
93 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017).
82
83
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Cable Communications Policy Act.94 The Act requires a cable operator to “destroy personally identifiable information” provided by subscribers if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for
which it was collected and there are no pending requests for the information.95 In Gubala, a former subscriber sued Time Warner after
learning that Time Warner had failed to destroy his personal information eight years after he cancelled his subscription.96 The Seventh Circuit denied standing.97 It explained that, even if Time Warner violated
the Act, the subscriber had failed to establish any factual harm, such
as the dissemination of his personal information, resulting from the
violation.98
These cases are but a small sample of the decisions denying
standing for violations of statutory provisions authorizing private actions when the violation does not result in a factual harm.99 The phenomenon is not limited to violations of statutes providing data
protections, nor is it limited to federal statutes. Federal courts have
demanded injury in fact for suits alleging violations of state statutes
regulating matters other than privacy. For example, in Hagy v. Demers
& Adams,100 James and Patricia Hagy sued a law firm for violating an
Ohio law by failing to identify itself as a debt collector in a letter that
it sent to them about a debt they owed.101 The Sixth Circuit held that
Id. at 910, 913.
47 U.S.C. § 551(e).
96 Gubala, 846 F.3d at 910.
97 Id. at 911.
98 Id. (“[Plaintiff’s] problem is that while he might well be able to prove a violation of [the
Act], he has not alleged any plausible (even if attenuated) risk of harm to himself from such a
violation—any risk substantial enough to be deemed ‘concrete.’ ” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016))).
99 For other cases, see also, e.g., Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 107, 117 (3d Cir.
2019) (denying standing in suit against J. Crew for publishing 10 digits of credit card numbers in
violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act); Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903
F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that individuals lacked standing to sue the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority for violating a section of FCRA providing that, before a
potential employer denies an applicant a job based on a criminal background check or a consumer report, the employer must provide the applicant with a description in writing of the applicant’s rights under FCRA); Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir.
2016) (denying standing for failure to destroy data as required by the Cable Communications
Act); Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding no standing
for an individual who alleged a retailer violated the Identification Act by collecting her zip
code). See generally WILSON C. FREEMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10303, ENFORCING FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10303.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR7M-JL56] (collecting cases denying standing for individuals alleging violations of federal law).
100 882 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2018).
101 See id. at 618–19.
94
95
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the Hagys lacked standing.102 It explained that, although the firm
might have violated the Ohio law, the Hagys suffered no harm from
the firm’s failure to identify itself as a debt collector.103
II.

SPOKEO

AND

CONTRACTS

The logic of Spokeo—that standing cannot rest on violations of
legal rights that do not result in factual harms—extends to suits alleging breach of contract. After all, contracts simply establish legal rights.
By Spokeo’s reasoning, a plaintiff should not have standing to sue for
breach of contract if the breach does not result in some additional
factual harm. Thus, given Spokeo’s holding that the violation of a statutory right does not constitute a valid basis for standing, the breach of
contractual rights should likewise not be a basis for standing.
A. A Brief Overview of Contract
A contract is a promise that creates legal obligations.104 In the
usual contract, one party promises to perform, or abstain from performing, some action in exchange for the other party promising to
perform, or refrain from performing, some action in return.105 Aside
from prohibitions on contracts that contravene public policy,106 the
law places no limits on the obligations created by a contract. Parties
can include entirely idiosyncratic terms. For example, one party can
agree to meow like a cat in exchange for the other party barking like a
dog. Nor does the law impose requirements that consideration have a
minimum market value.107 A person may agree to pay $1,000 for
something that the rest of the world does not value at all.
Commentators have offered several theories to explain contract
law, but none of these theories are descriptively or normatively complete.108 Some have argued that contracts are binding because they
embody promises that the parties have a moral obligation to perSee id. at 624.
See id. at 623–24.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A contract is a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
105 See id. § 71.1 (“To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be
bargained for.”).
106 See id. § 178.1 (“A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such
terms.”).
107 See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
108 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
102
103
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form.109 But the law has long rejected this theory.110 Instead of focusing on moral obligations, legal doctrine provides that a promise is
enforceable because the mutual exchange of consideration between
parties created a legal obligation,111 because the party making the
promise observed particular legal formalities,112 or because the promise induced reasonable reliance.113
Others have relied on economic efficiency to justify contract
114
law. When an exchange cannot happen simultaneously, one party
must bear the risk of performing its side of the bargain before the
other party performs.115 The enforceability of contracts mitigates this
YALE L.J. 541, 543 (2003) (“Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining
what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be.”).
See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA17 (2d ed. 2015) (“[S]ince a contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept
because a promise must be kept.”); Matthew A. Seligman, Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach,
117 MICH. L. REV. 885, 891 (2019) (“A dominant philosophical theory of contract law grounds
the normative justification of contract doctrine in the moral obligation to keep promises.”); see
also Curtis Bridgeman, Civil Recourse or Civil Powers?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011)
(noting that “in many cases courts go out of their way to acknowledge a promisor’s moral obligation even as they refuse to enforce the contract”); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1087 (1989) (analyzing approaches of contract morality); Randy E.
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 283 (1986) (“In short, while the
requirement of consent is in general supported by efficiency arguments, the normative justification for a consent theory of contract must be more broadly based.”).
110 Many have rejected this view that contracts rest on moral obligations. Opponents of this
view see no moral obligation to perform contracts and therefore argue that parties can choose to
breach if they are willing to pay the price. See, e.g., O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”); see also Barnett, supra
note 109, at 321 (discussing counterarguments to the moral theory of contract).
111 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
112 E.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (prohibiting the revocation
of firm offers, even if the offeror receives no consideration).
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981). Some have argued that all contracts are binding because they induce reliance. See Barnett, supra note 109, at
274. That theory, however, is not descriptively or normatively accurate. Not all statements that
induce reliance are binding. See id. at 274–75; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81(2)
(AM. L. INST. 1981) (“The fact that a promise does not of itself induce a performance or return
promise does not prevent the performance or return promise from being consideration for the
promise.”). Nor should all such statements be binding, because a speaker can never be sure
whether another will rely on her statements.
114 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
115 Kevin E. Davis & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Contracting for Personal Data, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 662, 679 (2019) (“Contract law generally plays a critical role in facilitating mutuallybeneficial exchanges that cannot be concluded instantaneously because performance either takes
time or is difficult to verify.”).
109
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risk. But that theory too is incomplete. Not all contract doctrines are
efficient,116 and even commentators who support an efficiency theory
argue that only some kinds of agreements and contract doctrines improve overall welfare.117
Still others have argued that contracts should be binding because
they are the product of bargained-for exchanges.118 One person makes
a promise in exchange for consideration from another person. But it is
unclear why mutual exchange should be the trigger for the enforceability of contracts, and there are many exceptions to this requirement
of mutual consideration.119 For example, various gratuitous promises
will constitute a binding contract.120
Despite the lack of a unified theory of contract law, the legal obligations created by a contract are no less binding than obligations from
other legal sources, such as the common law, regulations, and statutes.
Contracts are functionally private laws between the contracting parties. Likewise, a contract can create obligations that mirror statutory
obligations. Just as a statute can require a person to follow procedures
aimed at securing data, a contract can oblige a party to adopt practices
to protect data.121
The breach of a contract entitles the victim of the breach to a
judicial remedy122—typically damages or specific performance.123 The
usual damages for a breach are expectancy damages: sufficient com116 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW
234–35 (1979) (discussing contract rules that are not aimed at maximizing welfare).
117 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 114, at 90; see also Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana
Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral World, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1471, 1498–99 (2018)
(arguing the doctrine of unconscionability promotes efficiency only in some contexts); see generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (relying on efficiency to justify only some aspects of contract
law).
118 Barnett, supra note 109, at 287 (stating that bargained-for exchange is the predominant
theory of contract); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
640, 640 (1982) (stating that “traditionally” contracts have been enforced because of
“consideration”).
119 See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
411, 411–12 (1977) (listing enforceable gratuitous promises).
120 See, e.g., id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A
promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee
is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.”); see also id. §§ 82–89 (listing various
types of binding gratuitous promises).
121 See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842,
at *1 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2019) (recounting Federal Trade Commission consent decree that required Facebook “to implement more robust and verifiable data security protocols”).
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A contract is a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy . . . .”).
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pensation to put the victim of the breach in the position that she
would have been in had the contract been performed by the breaching
party.124 For example, if Dan breaches a contract with Sam to paint
Sam’s house for $100 and the next cheapest painter that Sam finds will
paint the house for $110, Sam is entitled to $10 in damages from Dan.
Awarding that $10 will result in Sam paying only $100 out of pocket
for the painting, in accord with the original contract; the balance is
covered by the $10 awarded by the court.
But expectancy damages are not the only type of damages that a
victim of a breach may seek. Among other things, contracts can prescribe liquidated damages for a breach.125 For example, a contract can
state that, if one party breaches the contract, that party must pay the
other $1,000, irrespective of the actual losses from the breach. These
clauses are particularly common in contracts where actual damages
would be hard to value. These clauses are also enforceable to the
same extent as any other contractual provision. So long as the clause is
not illegal, unconscionable, or inconsistent with some other general
contracts doctrine, the courts will enforce them if the other party has
breached.126
B. Standing to Enforce Contracts
There is an intuitive sense that, if parties have a valid contract
and one of the parties breaches, the other should have standing to
bring an action for its breach. For many contract suits, that is plainly
true because the breach of contract results in an injury in fact. Suppose Sam contracts to paint Jeff’s house for $500. If Sam paints the
house and Jeff refuses to pay, Sam has been injured in fact to the tune
of $500.
But for some cases, the standing inquiry is much more difficult.
Suppose Paul and Dave enter into a contract under which Paul gives
personal information to Dave and Dave agrees to destroy it in two
years. In return, Dave pays Paul consideration of $100. Dave fails to
destroy the data in two years. But he does nothing with the data. He
123 See Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120
YALE L.J. 690, 692 (2011).
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[T]he injured
party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest . . . .”).
125 Id. § 356(1) (“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement . . . .”).
126 See id. (prescribing the enforcement of liquidated damages “but only at an amount that
is reasonable”).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-2\GWN202.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 20

STANDING AND CONTRACTS

9-MAR-21

15:49

317

just retains it. Dave has breached the contract. But does Paul have
standing to sue Dave for breach of contract?
Spokeo and the cases implementing it suggest that the answer is
no. The breach of the contractual right, standing alone, should not
support standing. Contractual rights are simply legal rights,127 and
Spokeo makes clear that the violation of a legal right does not suffice.128 Instead, the violation must cause an additional injury in fact.129
Now, one might say that Dave’s failure to destroy Paul’s information
does constitute a sufficient factual harm to support standing. But
many courts after Spokeo have not agreed. For example, in Gubala v.
Time Warner Cable, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that the failure to
destroy personal information, as required by the Cable Communications Policy Act, does not constitute an injury in fact.130
Nothing in the text of Article III suggests that the standing test
should be different for contract rights than for statutory rights. Standing rests on Article III’s provision extending the judicial power to
“Cases” and “Controversies.”131 Neither the term “case” nor the term
“controversy” distinguishes between different types of civil disputes.132 As the debates surrounding ratification make clear, those
terms were used simply to describe disputes amenable to judicial resolution.133 Nothing suggests that disputes over contract rights were
more amenable or less amenable to judicial resolution than disputes
over other rights because the former involved contractual rights.
127 Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1460 (2009) (“Contracts create
legal rights and duties.”).
128 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
129

Id.

130

846 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2017).

131

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

There is some evidence that the term “controversies” did not extend to criminal cases. 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA, app. n.E at 420–21 (St. George Tucker, ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803) (explaining that while the term “case” referred to all disputes, “whether
civil or criminal,” the term “controversy” referred only to disputes “of a civil nature” and therefore excluded criminal cases). Modern commentators generally agree with this position. See
James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 555, 607 n.207 (1994) (collecting scholarly articles agreeing that “controversies,”
unlike “cases,” excludes criminal cases). But nothing suggests that, by using the term “controversy,” the Framers differentiated between different types of rights in civil actions.
132

133 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (James Madison) (explaining that it was “generally supposed that the jurisdiction given [in
Article III] was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature”).
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Nor does the theory underlying standing provide a basis for treating standing for contract actions differently from standing for statutory violations. According to the Court, the “single basic idea”
underlying Article III standing is “separation of powers.”134 Specifically, it has said, standing ensures that the federal judiciary stays
within its sphere of authority and does not resolve matters more appropriately addressed by the elected branches of the federal government.135 But this rationale does not support imposing higher standing
requirements for violations of statutory rights than for violations of
contract rights. The core duty of the judiciary is to remedy violations
of individual legal rights.136 As Chief Justice Marshall put it, “[t]he
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals . . . .”137 Contracts and statutes both create rights in individuals.
The role of the judiciary does not change depending on which type of
individual right is at stake. For all types of individual rights, the task of
the judiciary is to vindicate the right through civil actions.138
There also is no reason to think that the judiciary generally poses
more of a threat to the other branches of government when it vindicates private rights conferred by statute in suits between private individuals than when it vindicates contract rights.139 Contracts and
134 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752
(1984)); see also, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (“The law of
Article III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .” (quoting Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013))).
135 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (“The law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”); Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) (“[Standing] is founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
136 F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 715, 720 (2018) (“[T]he role of the courts is to provide remedies for legal wrongs.”);
SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (1883) (stating that the power of the
court is “the authority to determine the rights of person or property, by arbitrating between
adversaries, in specific controversies, at the instance of a party thereto” (citation omitted)); 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25 (stating that the “judicial power” includes the
power, “if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and . . . to apply the remedy”).
137 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
138 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 548 (2005) (“The immediate purpose of the typical common law suit was to permit the victim to obtain a pecuniary satisfaction
from the wrongdoer as an ‘equivalent’ to a literal restoration of his rights.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146)).
139 This is only a general proposition. Suits to vindicate some statutory rights can raise
acute separation of powers concerns. One example is a suit seeking to vindicate statutory rights
against the government, because the suit seeks to force the government to act. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1105 (2015) (arguing that suits
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statutes both create private rights, and they can both create identical
obligations. The same prohibitions on trespass, data retention, and
countless other things can be imposed by statute or by contract.
A second separation of powers reason given by the Court is that
standing prevents Congress from interfering with the Executive
through the creation of private causes of actions. Article II of the
Constitution vests the executive power in the President and imposes
on the President the obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”140 In Lujan, the Court said that requiring a plaintiff to
establish injury in fact when suing the government protects these presidential powers by preventing Congress from authorizing any individual to bring suit to force the Executive to act.141
This concern of preventing congressional interference with the
Executive ordinarily does not apply to contract actions. Most contract
suits are not against the government but are between private parties.142 Further, even in federal court, most contract actions turn on
state law, not a congressional enactment.143 But the Court has made
clear that neither reason justifies dispensing with the injury in fact requirement. In Spokeo, the Court held that the plaintiff needed to establish a concrete injury in fact even though his suit was against a
private person instead of against the Executive.144 And the Court has
consistently required plaintiffs to demonstrate injury in fact to establish standing to pursue state law actions in federal court.145
If anything, limiting standing for violations of statutory rights
raises greater separation of powers concerns than limiting standing for
against the government and its officials raise special separation of powers concerns). Another is
a suit seeking to vindicate statutory rights that intrude on the constitutional powers of the other
branches—such as a statute conferring on individuals power to grant pardons. See Hessick, supra
note 12, at 689 (explaining that suits seeking to enforce rights that intrude on other branches
raise special separation of powers concerns).
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
141 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
142 Thomas H. Cohen, Contract Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. 3 (Jan. 2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctvlc01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
259V-Z2M6].
143 Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31,
2019), U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics/2019/03/31 [https://perma.cc/PY4G-UWZS] (showing 4,532 contract actions
based on federal law and 20,889 contract actions based on diversity jurisdiction).
144 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016).
145 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 703, 715 (2013) (denying standing to sue to
defend California law, despite explicit determination by California that the plaintiff had been
authorized to pursue the suit); Hessick, supra note 14, at 101 n.300 (gathering cases in which
federal courts required injury in fact to establish standing to pursue state-law claims).
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violations of contract rights. Requiring an injury in fact to support
standing for the violation of a right functionally redefines that right.
Rights have practical value only to the extent that they can be vindicated.146 Requiring injury in fact for violations of statutory rights thus
limits the power of Congress. Congress cannot authorize suits to vindicate rights unless the violation of those rights results in factual harm.
By contrast, requiring injury in fact for violations of contractual rights
does not limit government power. Contracts are not the product of
legislative power. They are the product of agreements between
individuals.147
This is not to say that breaches of contract should not suffice for
standing as a normative matter. To the contrary, there are strong arguments that violations of any legal rights, including contractual rights,
should support standing. But Spokeo rejected that position.148 And if
we accept Spokeo’s holding that the violation of a statutory right does
not constitute a valid basis for standing,149 then the breach of contractual rights should likewise not be a basis for standing.
C. Breach of Contract as Injury in Fact
Although the violation of a right does not itself support standing,
one might argue that standing for all breaches of contract is consistent
with Spokeo because a breach of contract itself is a cognizable injury
in fact.150 There are five different arguments supporting this position.
First, a breach of contract constitutes a broken promise, and the
breaking of a promise is a cognizable injury in fact. Second, a breach
of contract injures a person because it deprives him of the benefit of
his bargain. Third, a breach injures a person by depriving him of the
benefits of the efficiencies of his contract. Fourth, the victim of a
See cases cited supra note 13.
One might try to distinguish breach of contract actions from actions alleging violations
of statutes on the ground that the former involves the violation of private rights while the latter
does not. The theory would be that contracts create rights, while statutes do not create rights but
instead create only private causes of action. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of
Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 784 (2004) (drawing historical distinction between causes of action
and rights). But the argument rests on faulty logic. Causes of actions vindicate rights. See id.
Even if the existence of a right does not imply a cause of action, the existence of a cause of
action does imply a right. In any event, it is highly unlikely that modern legislatures draw fine
distinctions between causes of actions and rights; the Court itself has not. See Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (describing citizen suit provision as conferring statutory right).
148 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
149 See id.
150 For this argument to provide a basis for distinguishing violations of statutes, the relevant
injury cannot be the consequence of breaching the contract because violating the statute has the
same consequence. Rather, it is the breach itself, irrespective of the consequence.
146
147
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breach of contract is injured because he relies on performance of the
contract and the breach thwarts that reliance. Fifth, a breach of contract constitutes an intangible injury in fact that was historically recognized as a basis for a lawsuit.151 None of these arguments, however,
establishes that a breach of contract constitutes a cognizable factual
injury. If we accept Spokeo’s holding that the violation of a statutory
right does not constitute a valid basis for standing, then the breach of
contractual rights should likewise not be a basis for standing.
1. Breach as Broken Promise
Contracts embody promises.152 If a contract is a promise, a breach
of contract constitutes a broken promise. One might argue that the
breaking of a promise constitutes an injury in fact for the person given
the promise, and this injury suffices for standing. Under this theory,
the injury is not the failure to deliver whatever was promised; rather,
it is the fact of breaking the promise itself that constitutes the injury.
But given Spokeo and other decisions defining what constitutes a sufficient injury in fact,153 the injury of a broken promise does not provide a basis for recognizing standing for breach of contract.
There are two types of factual injuries that the fact of breaking a
promise—in contradiction to not delivering whatever was promised—
may inflict. The first harm is moral. A promise creates a moral obligation to deliver on the promise, and the failure to honor that promise
inflicts a moral injury on the promisee. But this type of moral injury is
insufficient to support standing. According to the Court, the injury
forming the basis for standing must be “concrete.”154 Moral injuries
are not concrete.155 They do not inflict economic or physical harm,
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
See FRIED, supra note 109, at 17 (“[S]ince a contract is first of all a promise, the contract
must be kept because a promise must be kept.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 289 (1881) (“The common element of all contracts might be said to be a promise.”).
153 See supra Section I.B.
154 E.g., Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in
the context of a statutory violation.”); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (“[Standing]
requires allegations—and, eventually, proof—that the plaintiff ‘personal[ly]’ suffered a concrete
and particularized injury in connection with the conduct about which he complains.” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540)). Although the Court has long required concreteness, it has varied the phrasing of the requirement over time. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, for example, the Court did not say that the injury itself must be concrete; instead,
it said that the injury must be to a “concrete interest.” 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992). In some
cases, the Court has phrased the test both ways. Compare Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756
(1984) (focusing on “concrete, personal interest”), with id. at 763 (focusing on “concrete injury”
(quoting Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 571 n.10 (1974))).
155 One might also argue that, because it defines jurisdiction and does not purport to make
151
152
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interfere with the plaintiff’s freedom, or otherwise inflict a palpable
harm. Instead, the harm from a moral wrong is the offense to an individual’s sense of right and wrong.156
The Court has consistently refused to recognize standing based
on similar sorts of injuries.157 For example, in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,158
the Court held that individuals lacked standing to challenge the government’s conveyance of property to a religious institution.159 The
Court explained that the government’s violation of the plaintiff’s asserted “right” to a government that obeys the law did not constitute
an injury for standing purposes.160 Nor, the Court stated, did the government’s breach of the plaintiff’s firmly held belief in separation of
church and state provide a basis for standing.161 Likewise, in Allen v.
Wright,162 the Court stated that offense to an individual’s belief that
racial discrimination is wrong is not a sufficient injury to support
standing to challenge racial discrimination against another.163 According to the Court, recognizing standing for those types of injuries would

substantive judgments, standing doctrine should not turn on value-laden moral judgments.
Courtney M. Cox, Risky Standing: Deciding on Injury, 8 NE. U. L.J. 75, 94–95 (2016) (“But we
should avoid, where possible, assuming that the courts have adopted controversial meta-ethical
positions to understand a given doctrine, particularly given some members of the courts’ selfprofessed general disdain for value theory—or, at least self-professed disdain for needing to rely
on the fruits of practical philosophy.”).
156 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
926 (2010) (defining moral wrongs as wrongs against social norms). Of course, some moral injuries that cause psychological or dignitary harms could potentially be a basis for standing. See,
e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA. L. REV. 1659, 1666 (1992) (defining “moral injury” as “an affront to the victim’s value or
dignity”).
157 See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (stating that individuals do not
have standing “for the vindication of the [sic] value interests” (quoting United States v. Students
Challenging Regul. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973))); see also Gonzales v. N. Twp. of
Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Offense to moral and religious sensitivities
does not constitute an injury in fact and is insufficient to confer standing.”).
158

454 U.S. 464 (1982).

159

Id. at 467–68, 485–86.

Id. at 483; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223
n.13 (1974) (rejecting standing based on “the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by . . . citizens”).
160

161 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 (“It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but standing is not measured by
the intensity of the litigant’s interest . . . .”).
162

468 U.S. 737 (1984).

163

Id. at 755–56.
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transform the courts into “a vehicle for the vindication of the value
interests of concerned bystanders.”164
The logic of these cases applies equally to moral injuries.165 Recognizing standing for a person who is offended or feels wronged by
another’s actions would open the courts to anyone wishing to vindicate their idiosyncratic value interests. A bystander would have standing if he was offended when a police officer arrested a friend, when
one person failed to use an honorific title when addressing another, or
when someone failed to hold the door open for other people.166
The other potential harm resulting from a broken promise is psychological. The victim may suffer emotional distress from the promise
not being fulfilled.167 Courts disagree on whether a psychological harm
suffices for standing.168 One line of cases has refused to recognize
standing based on emotional distress.169 For example, in Valley Forge
Christian College, the Court held that the “psychological” harm that
people suffered from watching the government disobey the law did
not constitute a sufficient injury for standing.170 Likewise, the Court
has held that individuals did not have standing based on the distress
they felt from knowing that animals in foreign countries might be in164 Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669,
687 (1973)).
165 Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that “moral outrage,
however profoundly and personally felt, does not endow [a plaintiff] with standing to sue”). As a
general matter, moral wrongs are not legally actionable. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
156, at 930–32; HOLMES, supra note 152, at 33 (distinguishing between moral and legal wrongs,
and observing that the former is not actionable).
166 One might argue that breach of contract does not raise the same generalized grievance
problem as statutes because contractual rights extend only to the contracting party. But contractual rights are not more individualized than statutory rights. Although they apply to everybody,
statutes confer individualized rights on each individual. That is the reason that, if a company
poisons a large number of people by emitting toxins in violation of a statute, each victim has
standing to sue. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167 This psychological distress from a breach is related to the moral injury from the breach.
See Johnathan Shay, Moral Injury, 31 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCH. 182, 182 (2014), https://
www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4602-moralinjuryshayexcerptpdf [https://perma.cc/MG47-854F]
(discussing the psychological harm from moral injury).
168 Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81 BROOK. L. REV.
1555, 1581–83 (2016) (discussing the divergence in decisions).
169 E.g., United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., 783 F.3d 607,
616 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that “purely psychological harm” is insufficient for standing); Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that “mere emotional injuries” do
not support standing). ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.) (“The fact that the plaintiffs do not like a cross to be displayed on public property—
even that they are deeply offended by such a display—does not confer standing . . . .”).
170

454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982).
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jured.171 The rationale of these cases is that, if emotional harm suffices
for standing, standing would pose no barrier to suit. Anyone upset by
anything would have standing to sue.172
A different line of decisions has found standing based on psychological harms. For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,173 the Court held that a person
who liked to “fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near” a river had
standing to sue a facility for discharging pollutants into the river based
on his “concern[ ] that the water was polluted by [the] discharges.”174
Similarly, in ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus,175
the D.C. Circuit held that the emotional distress a person suffered
from observing mistreated elephants at the circus sufficed for
standing.176
The distinguishing factor between the cases appears to be
whether the emotional harm results from something directly experienced by the plaintiff.177 If the emotional trauma results from mistreatment or discrimination targeting the plaintiff, that emotional
injury will support standing. Likewise, if the plaintiff directly observes
mistreatment of animals or pollution in a stream, the distress from
those observations can support standing. Limiting standing in this way
ensures that the courts do not become vehicles to vindicate anyone’s
grievances about anything. Instead, only the set of individuals whose
distress results from personal experience may proceed in court.178
This analysis suggests that the emotional injury from a broken
promise should suffice for standing. The emotional distress a person
experiences from a broken promise is the result of personal experiSee Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566–67, 578 (1992).
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485, 486–87 (allowing standing on psychological harm from
seeing government disobey the law would result in the courts becoming “ombudsmen of the
general welfare”).
173 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
174 Id. at 181–83.
175 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
176 Id. at 335 (basing standing on the “aesthetic and emotional injury” from seeing the
mistreated animals).
177 Cf. Cath. League for Religious & Civ. Rts. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d
1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (“What distinguishes the cases is that in Valley Forge, the psychological consequence was merely disagreement with the government, but in the others, for which the
Court identified a sufficiently concrete injury, the psychological consequence was exclusion or
denigration on a religious basis within the political community.”).
178 Cf. ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
emotional distress at viewing a cross is not a basis for standing because “it is not by itself a fact
that distinguishes [the plaintiffs] from anyone else in the United States who disapproves of such
displays”).
171
172
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ence. The promise was owed to the plaintiff, not to somebody else.
But the problem is that the same conclusion should apply to violations
of statutes. Just as people can be distressed by breaches of contracts,
people may be distressed by violations of statutory obligations owed
to them. For example, the veterans in Beck v. McDonald would have
standing to sue based on the distress in knowing that the VA violated
their rights by failing to follow procedures owed to them.179 Their distress would not be the product of observing illegal actions against
others; rather, it would be the product of misconduct directly experienced by them. But it is highly doubtful that psychological distress
would not be a basis for standing. Valley Forge makes clear that, if the
violation of a right does not support standing, the psychological distress from the violation of that right also does not support standing.180
Thus, the refusal to find standing for violations of statutory rights
strongly suggests that the psychological distress resulting from the
breach of a contract right also would not provide a basis for
standing.181
2. Contract as Bargained-For Exchange
Another argument for injury in fact rests on the bargained-forexchange theory of contracts. According to this argument, a breach
results in the non-breaching party not receiving the benefit of his barSee supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).
181 Viewing breaches of contract as moral wrongs also does not provide a clean basis for
distinguishing standing for breaches of contract from standing for violations of statutes. Just as
some argue that contracts establish a moral obligation, e.g., Seligman, supra note 109, at 891 (“A
dominant philosophical theory of contract law grounds the normative justification of contract
doctrine in the moral obligation to keep promises.”), others argue that there is a moral obligation to obey the law, see Hunt’s Heirs v. Robinson’s Heirs, 1 Tex. 748, 759 (1847) (“There is a
moral obligation in the absence of a penalty to obey the law.”); Mercantile Tr. & Deposit Co. v.
Mellon, 46 A. 308, 309 (Pa. 1900) (“Every citizen of a state is under a moral obligation to obey
the laws . . . .”); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1385 (1998) (“Law, in a democracy, is more than a price tag. It is a
command in which we participate, a limit on unacceptable behavior, and an architecture for
social, political, and economic interaction.”). But see Stephen E. Sachs, The Law and Morals of
Interpretation, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 113 (2018) (“ ‘[W]hether [we have] a
moral obligation to obey the law’ is a ‘traditional’ (indeed, ancient) question . . . .” (alterations in
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Frederick Schauer, Deconstructing Law’s Normativity 13
(Nov. 30, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3080437 [https://perma.cc/
JDP9-P2XT]; Sophocles, Antigone, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 126, 127–128 (E.F. Watling
trans., Penguin Books 1974))). For example, under a corrective justice theory, one of the prominent theories underlying tort liability, “legal rights and duties . . . should be understood as embodiments of moral rights among private parties.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 697 (2003).
179
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gain, and depriving the non-breaching party of that benefit is a factual
injury. For example, suppose Paul and Dave enter into a contract
under which Dave buys Paul’s data. Under the terms of the contract,
Dave pays $100 for the data and must protect the data. Suppose further that, without the promise to protect the data, Paul would have
insisted that Dave pay $110. After entering into the contract, Dave
breaches it by not protecting Paul’s data.
The strongest argument in favor of standing is that Paul has been
factually injured by not receiving the data protection that Dave promised. After all, Paul was entitled to that protection under the contract.
But that theory conflicts with the cases following Spokeo. In Beck v.
McDonald, the Fourth Circuit held that the failure to adopt procedures to protect data does not, by itself, constitute an injury in fact.182
So too, not adopting the procedures required by the contract does not
constitute an injury.183 This is not to say that Beck was rightly decided.
It is only to say that, given Beck’s holding that the failure to follow
statutorily prescribed procedures to protect data is not a factual injury, the failure to provide the protection required by the contract
should not be a cognizable injury in fact.
Another possible theory is that Paul has “lost” the $10 he agreed
to forego in exchange for Dave’s promise to protect the data. By reducing the price if Dave agreed to protect his data, one might say,
Paul functionally paid Dave $10 in exchange for Dave’s protection,
but Dave did not deliver. This “loss” of $10, however, does not provide a factual injury to support standing.
Paul did not actually lose $10; he never had the $10 in the first
place. Instead, he lost the data protection for which he contracted.
The $10 is the value that Paul placed on the data protection. But that
valuation does not make the data breach an injury. One cannot create
standing by placing value on something that otherwise is not a basis
for standing. Otherwise, a plaintiff who lacks standing could simply
claim that he values the basis for his lawsuit.184 Thus, a plaintiff could
848 F.3d 262, 277 (4th Cir. 2017).
It is inconsequential that those procedures were required by statute in Beck instead of
by contract. Beck’s conclusion was that the failure to comply with the legal obligation to follow
procedures does not constitute a factual harm. See id. The source of the legal obligation is
irrelevant.
184 Presumably, a person who brings a good-faith lawsuit to enforce a statutory right places
at least some value on that right, because otherwise, bringing the suit would not be worth the
cost of litigation. Fletcher, supra note 17 at 231 (“If we put to one side people who lie about their
states of mind, we should concede that anyone who claims to be injured is, in fact, injured if she
can prove the allegations of her complaint.”).
182
183
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avoid the Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo—that the violation of a
procedural right is not a basis for standing—simply by claiming that
he highly valued that procedure.185
To be sure, if Paul can get into court, Paul may be entitled to $10
because Dave breached the contract. But that entitlement to $10 is
not an injury. Instead, it is the compensation for the harm of Dave’s
failure to protect the data. But that harm—not protecting the data—is
not an injury in fact under Beck.186
Another problem with treating the loss of foregone consideration
as an injury in fact is that it fails the traceability requirement. To support standing, the “injury in fact” claimed by the plaintiff must be
“fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant.187 Foregone consideration does not meet this causation requirement. A party foregoes
consideration when they enter into the contract, not when the contract is
breached. Paul opted not to demand $10 when he entered into the
contract; the breach did not cause him to lose $10.
3. Economic Efficiency
The efficiency theory of contracts also does not provide a sound
basis to argue that breaches of contract are necessarily injuries in fact.
This theory provides that enforcing contracts results in increased welfare; thus, leaving breaches unremedied reduces welfare.188 But not all
contracts increase welfare for the parties. An obvious example is when
a person enters into a contract to purchase a good that is readily available from other vendors at a significantly lower price. A breach by the
vendor puts the victim in a better position because he can obtain the
same good at a lower price.189
185 Indeed, idiosyncratic valuation would undermine all of the Supreme Court’s decisions
denying standing for lack of injury in fact. For example, simply by claiming he idiosyncratically
valued the information, a plaintiff could circumvent the Court’s holding in United States v. Richardson—that individuals lack standing to sue the United States for failing to publish the receipts
and expenditures of the CIA. See 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
186 Further undermining this argument is that a plaintiff might give up nothing when faced
with a breach of contract. Many types of gratuitous promises constitute enforceable contracts.
See Posner, supra note 119, at 411–12.
187 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
188 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 114, at 93.
189 Nor can standing rest on the idea that enforcing contracts increases the overall welfare
of society. The Court has stated that, to have standing, each plaintiff must establish a personalized injury in fact. Injuries to the public or the general welfare are precisely the kinds of generalized grievances that cannot support standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498–99
(2009) (refusing to recognize standing for a group whose members each faced a small probability
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4. Reliance
A fourth possible theory to support standing for breach of contract is that a breach is an injury in fact because it interferes with the
plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s promise in the contract. But reliance is not a requirement for a contract to be binding.190 Some people
might enter into a contract hoping that it will be performed but anticipating that it probably will not. Such people do not suffer the factual
harm of disappointed expectations when the contract is breached. Because reliance is not a prerequisite to contracts, thwarted reliance
should not be the basis for standing. At the least, thwarted reliance
does not provide a basis for standing for individuals who did not rely
on performance when they entered into the contract.
Moreover, basing standing on thwarting a plaintiff’s reliance on a
contract does not provide a sound way to distinguish breaches of contracts from violations of statutes. One might rely on statutory prohibitions in the same way as a provision in a contract.191 Paul might give
data to Dave only because he thinks that Dave will obey a statute that
requires the destruction of the data in two years. If Dave thwarts
Paul’s reliance by failing to obey that law, Paul has been injured in the
same way that he would have been had he relied on a comparable
contractual provision.
5. Historically Recognized Intangible Injury
According to the Court, one function of standing is to ensure that
federal courts resolve those disputes that courts traditionally adjudicated.192 Thus, in Spokeo the Court stated that, even if a plaintiff has
suffered only an “intangible harm” that ordinarily would not support
standing, that intangible harm can support standing if it is comparable
to a harm that historically was the basis for a lawsuit.193 Although the
of harm, even though the aggregate probability of a member of the group suffering harm was
significant).
190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[R]eliance is
not essential to the formation of a bargain.”).
191 See ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 47–55 (1968) (arguing that society generally expects obedience to the law); Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance
with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2012) (discussing how people can be
expected to obey the law); cf. Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[A]n officer who acts in reliance on a duly-enacted statute . . . is ordinarily entitled to qualified
immunity.”).
192 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
193 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is
grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm
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Court did not define “intangible harms,” it gave the examples of deprivations of the right to free speech and the right to free exercise of
religion.194 Based on these examples, one might argue that breach of
contract is an intangible harm that supports standing because historically one could sue for breach of contract, even if that breach resulted
in no additional factual harm.
It is true that a person could sue for breach of contract even if
that breach resulted in no other harm than the breach. By the seventeenth century, assumpsit was the principal action to remedy breaches
of contract.195 Although assumpsit was an action on the case,196 which
ordinarily required proof of damages to maintain,197 proof of damages
from the breach was not a requirement for an assumpsit action to
remedy a breach of contract.198 Instead, to maintain an action for ashas a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a
lawsuit in English or American courts. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2000).
194 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
195 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 345 (3d ed. 1923) (“Thus the
action [of] assumpsit . . . gradually supplanted debt or became alternative to it in all cases.”).
Assumpsit was only one of four writs available for breach of contract. Eric Alden, Reversing the
Reliance Revolution in Contract, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1609, 1615–18 (2018). The other writs applied
only in limited circumstances. See id. Two of those writs—debt upon obligation and covenant—
required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had failed to perform an obligation that he had
promised to perform in a “sealed” formal document. Id. at 1616. Although the failure to perform that obligation likely resulted in damages, proof of damages was not a requirement to bring
the actions. Id. at 1616–17. The third writ, debt upon contract, entitled a plaintiff to recover if he
had already performed his obligation under the contract. Id. at 1615–18. That requirement was
comparable to the injury in fact requirement. A plaintiff could maintain his action only if he
demonstrated that he had expended money or effort. Id. at 1618. But plaintiffs could avoid this
requirement by pleading their cases in assumpsit. Id.
196 See Eric Alden, Promissory Estoppel and the Origins of Contract Law, 9 NE. U. L. REV.
1, 29 (2017).
197 See Hessick, supra note 17, at 281 (“[T]o maintain an action on the case, which was the
appropriate action for the indirect invasion of a right, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate both
legal injury and damage.” (footnote omitted)). But that damage requirement was not absolute,
see A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 580–81 (1975) (explaining the superfluity of damages to actions on the case and citing cases in which actions on the case
proceeded without factual harm), and in any event it largely collapsed in the eighteenth century
as courts became resistant to denying relief to plaintiffs whose rights had been violated but who
could not demonstrate harm. See Hessick, supra note 17 , at 281–82 (“The distinction between
actions for trespass and actions on the case began to collapse in the early eighteenth century as
courts became resistant to denying relief to plaintiffs whose rights had been violated but who
could not demonstrate harm.”); see also, e.g., Weller v. Baker (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 892, 897 (KB)
(permitting action on the case for a person illegally taking water from a well; concluding that
even though damages were not shown, they could be assumed); Wells v. Watling (1778) 96 Eng.
Rep. 726, 726 (KB) (permitting action on the case against defendant who overgrazed his sheep,
even though the plaintiff presented no evidence that the overgrazing affected his sheep).
198 According to some, the consideration requirement stemmed from the damage require-
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sumpsit to recover on a breach of contract,199 one had to establish only
that the defendant made a promise, that the plaintiff offered consideration for the promise, and that the defendant breached the promise.200
If those requirements were met—if the plaintiff offered the defendant
consideration in exchange for a promise, and the defendant subsequently breached that promise—the plaintiff could sue for breach of
contract, even if the breach did not result in a factual harm.201
But Spokeo rejected the same historical argument in holding that
standing cannot rest solely on the violation of a statute.202 The law
historically recognized a number of actions that did not require proof
of factual harm.203 For those actions, legal injury alone sufficed. Facment of an action on the case. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 195, at 337, 345–47. The theory is
that consideration amounted to damages because it constituted detrimental reliance by the
plaintiff. But others have responded that this theory rests on retrofitted reasoning because the
consideration requirement predated the advent of the action on the case. SIMPSON, supra note
197, at 580–81; see also J. B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1888)
(concluding that “it seems impossible to refer consideration to a single source” after identifying
“three distinct theories of its origin”).
199 Assumpsit was not limited to breach of contract. Ames, supra note 198, at 2 (listing
assumpsit actions that “were not originally, and are not to-day, regarded as actions of contract”).
Assumpsit was the appropriate action for any wrongs involving misperformance of an assumed
obligation (including, for instance, when a person voluntarily helped an unconscious victim on
the road). See 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 164–66 (3d ed. 1768).
Breach of contract is one instance where someone failed to perform an assumed obligation.
200 SIMPSON, supra note 197, at 406. According to some, a plaintiff could recover for the
breach of a promise only if the plaintiff relied on that promise, 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 195,
at 337, and consideration established reliance because a plaintiff changed his position by offering
consideration, id. at 345–47; SIMPSON, supra note 197, at 324. From this view, one might argue
that plaintiffs did have to demonstrate factual harm other than the breach to maintain a contract
action, and that harm was the consideration that the plaintiff provided. But this theory of the
origin of consideration apparently is inaccurate. See SIMPSON, supra note 197, at 324–25. Courts
instead viewed consideration as important because it demonstrated the motivation for a promise,
as opposed to a harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 325.
201 See 2 JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS
75 (1790) (“If he brought an action upon the agreement, he could shew no real damage; he could
therefore recover only a nominal one.”); Miles v. Miller, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 134, 137 (1876); Beard
v. Sloan, 38 Ind. 128, 134 (1871); Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485, 487–88 (1818); Clinton v. Mercer, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 119, 120 (1819) (“[W]henever a non-performance is established, although no
real loss be proved, nominal damages, at least, ought to be given.”); 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1001, at 29 (1964) (“If [plaintiff] makes no [proof of harm], the judgment in his favor will be for nominal damages only.”).
202 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
203 See Hessick, supra note 17, at 281 (“While factual injury alone was never sufficient to
warrant redress, legal injury alone was adequate for some actions.”); SIMPSON, supra note 197, at
580–81 (noting that in trespass in vi et armis and libel, damages need not be proved); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 26 (2000) (noting that a plaintiff suing in trespass did not have to
show a pecuniary loss, whereas a plaintiff could not recover under a writ of case unless he
proved some legally cognizable harm).

R

R

R

R
R
R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-2\GWN202.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 34

STANDING AND CONTRACTS

9-MAR-21

15:49

331

tual harm was unnecessary. For example, a plaintiff could bring a writ
for trespass, which was the action to remedy a direct, forceful invasion
of rights, even if the invasion of rights did no harm.204
Among those actions for which factual harm was unnecessary
were actions expressly conferred by statutes to enforce statutory
rights. Statutes could confer legal rights on individuals,205 and they
could authorize actions to vindicate those rights.206 The only requirement to bring those actions was that the plaintiff satisfy whatever elements the statute prescribed.207 As the House of Lords put it in
Donaldson v. Beckett,208 the statutes prescribed the “terms and conditions” for maintaining statutory actions.209 Consequently, if a statute
did not require the plaintiff to establish a factual harm, the plaintiff
need not demonstrate a factual harm to maintain the action.210
Highlighting this point—that a plaintiff need not establish a factual harm to bring a statutory cause of action if the statute did not
specify factual harm as a requirement—is that a plaintiff was required
to establish factual harm to maintain an action to vindicate a statutory
right when the statute did not provide a cause of action. If a statute
did not provide a cause of action, a plaintiff could still vindicate his
204 SIMPSON, supra note 197, at 580–81 (noting that in trespass in vi et armis and libel,
damages need not be proved).
205 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 689, 694 (2004).
206 See Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846–47 (HL) (discussing copyright
statute prescribing “terms and conditions” for recovery); 1 SIR JOHN COMYNS, DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 309, 320 (Stewart Kyd ed., 4th ed. 1793) (noting that “the express words of
the statute” may provide a remedy for statutory violations); accord SIR EDWARD COKE, THE
SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1642) (“[I]f any man feeleth
himself grieved, contrary to any article in any Statute, he shall have present remedy in
Chancery . . . .”).
207 5 SIR JOHN COMYNS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 359–60 (Samuel Rose ed., 4th
ed. 1800) (“As, in an action founded on a statute, the plaintiff ought to aver every fact necessary
to inform the court that his case is within the statute . . . .”).
208

1 Eng. Rep. 837 (HL).

209

Id. at 847.

Consistent with this history, through the 1980s, the Court held that a statute could provide the basis for standing, stating that the “injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue
of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing . . . .’ ” Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)); see also
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 n.17 (1986) (“The Illinois Legislature . . . has the power to
create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In such a case, the requirements
of Art. III may be met.”); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3 (“Congress may enact statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without
the statute.”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (stating that to have standing the
plaintiff may “rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process”).
210
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statutory rights by bringing a common law action.211 That common law
action was an action on the case,212 which, as noted earlier, did traditionally require proof of factual harm.213
Despite receiving various briefs describing this history,214 the
Spokeo Court refused to recognize standing based solely on the violation of a statute. Instead, the Court said, “standing requires a concrete
211 See Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (“A disregard of the command of
[a] statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied, according to a doctrine of the common law . . . .”); see also COKE, supra note 206, at 118
(“When any Act doth prohibit any wrong or vexation, though no action be particularly named in
the Act, yet the party grieved shall have an action grounded upon this Statute . . . .”); Ashby v.
White (1703) 91 Eng. Rep. 19, 20 (KB) (Holt, C.J., dissenting) (“If a statute gives a right, the
common law rill give a remedy to maintain that right . . . .”); Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791
(KB) (“[F]or where-ever a statute enacts anything, or prohibits anything, for the advantage of
any person, that person shall have remedy to recover the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done him contrary to law by the same statute; for it would be a fine thing to
make a law by which one has a right, but no remedy but in equity; and the action must be against
the terre-tenant.”); Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 639 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817) (No. 2121) (Story, J.)
(“[U]pon every statute made for the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an action lies
by the party grieved, either by the express words of the statute or by implication; and that such
action shall be recompense to the party.”); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23;
COKE, supra note 206, at 55 (“[E]very Act of Parliament made against any injury, mischiefe, or
grievance doth either expressly, or impliedly give a remedy to the party wronged, or grieved [by
the violation] . . . .”); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 187 (Mich. 1845) (“It is a general principle of
the common law, that whenever the law gives a right, or prohibits an injury, it also gives a
remedy by action; and, where no specific remedy is give[n] for an injury complained of, a remedy
may be had by special action on the case.”); Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and
the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 995
(2000) (listing examples of cases that recognized new common law causes of action).
212 See Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (KB) (Holt, C.J.); Bellia Jr., supra note 147,
at 840 (“In several English and state cases decided at law, it was an action on the case that the
plaintiff brought to remedy an injury that a statutory violation caused.”).
213 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Even when a statute expressly provided a
cause of action, a plaintiff could forego that cause of action and instead pursue this separate
common law action to vindicate his statutory right. See 1 COMYNS, supra note 206, at 322 (“[I]f a
statute gives a remedy in the affirmative (without a negative expressed or implied) for a matter,
which was actionable by the common law, the party may sue at the common law, as well as upon
the statute; for this does not take away the common law.”); Rowning v. Goodchild (1773) 96
Eng. Rep. 536, 538 (KB) (rejecting the argument that an express action in a statute precludes a
common law action, stating that “if the action lies at common law, as we think it does, the
[statutory] penalty is only an accumulative sanction”). Unless, of course, the statute meant to
preclude the common law action. See Bellia Jr., supra note 147, at 843 & n.298; Underhill v.
Ellicombe (1825) 148 Eng. Rep. 489, 491 (KB) (“This is a claim given by statute, and the same
statute which creates it prescribes a particular remedy for its enforcement. Therefore, it appears
to us that no other can be resorted to.”).
214 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5260469, at *19–23; Brief for
Public Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.
Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5261536, at *18–23.
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injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”215 The rejection of
that argument from history for statutory actions suggests that it should
be rejected for contract actions as well. If individuals must establish
injury in fact for statutory violations even if the statute conferring the
action does not require proof of injury in fact, so too they must be
required to establish injury in fact for contract actions.216
III.

OTHER REASONS

FOR

DISTINGUISHING CONTRACTS

Although the logic of Spokeo extends to contract actions, there
may be other reasons—reasons that Spokeo had no occasion to consider—to treat standing for breach of contract differently. One argument is that requiring injury in fact to establish standing for contracts
impairs freedom of contract. Another is that defendants should be
more easily sued for breach of contract than for violations of statutes
because contractual obligations are voluntarily assumed while statutory obligations are involuntarily imposed. A third is that, because
state law predominantly regulates contracts, standing for breach of
contract raises federalism concerns that support broad standing. This
Part addresses those arguments and concludes that none is persuasive.
A. Freedom of Contract
One of the central virtues of contract is that it allows individuals
to choose which legal obligations to assume. This freedom of contract—the ability of individuals to choose what contracts to enter
into—supports individual autonomy.217 It also promotes economic efficiency by allowing individuals to allocate their money and resources
as they see fit.218 Requiring an injury in fact to support standing for
breach of contract limits freedom of contract by restricting the enforceability of rights that parties create through contracts.219 Even if a
contract explicitly authorizes federal lawsuits in the event of a breach,
parties cannot resort to federal court to enforce the contract if the
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
Although the Court rejected this historical argument for actions based on violations of
statutes, it could accept this historical argument for contract actions. But to do so would be
unprincipled. Allowing that path would mean that courts decide outcomes first, and then choose
whatever arguments are useful to support their position.
217 FRIED, supra note 109, at 7 (arguing that contract law is required by the “liberal ideal”
that we leave people “free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours”); see generally
Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263
(1999) (discussing the relationship of freedom to freedom of contract).
218 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 120–22 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing
that contracts promote efficiency because they permit individuals to assign subjective values).
219 See cases cited supra note 13 and accompanying text.
215
216
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breach does not cause factual harm. Accordingly, one might argue,
preserving freedom of contract demands dispensing with the injury in
fact requirement for contract actions.
Despite its importance,220 freedom of contract does not support
creating an exception to the injury in fact requirement for contract
actions. Standing is a constitutional doctrine. It defines the federal judiciary’s power under Article III to resolve disputes.221 Since abandoning Lochner222 and similar cases in the 1930s,223 courts have
consistently held that freedom of contract does not deserve special
constitutional treatment.224 Instead, contracts are like other economic
and societal interests that legislatures can broadly regulate.225 Because
it is not of constitutional dimensions, freedom of contract does not
support creating a special constitutional exception to Article III standing to facilitate the enforcement of contracts.
Dispensing with injury in fact for contracts while requiring it for
statutory violations would also elevate an individual’s freedom to contract over Congress’s power to legislate. Unlike freedom of contract,
Congress’s power to legislate is a constitutionally protected interest.
The Constitution assigns to Congress the power to enact statutes creating rights and prescribing remedies for violations of those rights.226
That constitutional interest is at the core of standing doctrine, which
aims to protect the political powers from judicial encroachment.227 Requiring injury in fact interferes with that power by limiting the enforceability of rights that Congress creates. Congress cannot create
rights that can be enforced in federal court if the violation of the right
does not cause factual harm.228 If injury in fact limits Congress’s con220 Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Pippin, 725 F. App’x 717, 725 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he freedom of individuals to contract is an important part of our society . . . .” (quoting Siloam Springs
Hotel, LLC v. Century Surety Co., 392 P.3d 262, 267 (Okla. 2017))).
221

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

222

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
223

224

Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391 (“The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”).

Id. at 392 (stating that the legislature has authority to regulate “that wide department of
activity which consists of the making of contracts . . . .” (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911))).
225

226

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.”).
227

228 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)).
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stitutional power to create enforceable rights, it also should limit the
sub-constitutional interest in freedom of contract.229
B. Consent
Although contracts and statutes both impose legal obligations,
they derive from different sources. Contractual obligations are the
product of an agreement between the contracting parties. People can
choose the terms of their contractual obligations.230 By contrast, statutory obligations are not voluntary; the law independently imposes
those obligations irrespective of the parties’ consent.231 One might argue that because defendants voluntarily enter into contracts, defendants should be more susceptible to suit for violating contracts than for
violating statutes and a more relaxed standing requirement should
therefore apply in contract actions.232
But the consensual nature of contracts does not provide a sound
basis for dispensing with the injury in fact requirement for contracts.
Whether an obligation is voluntary or involuntary focuses on the defendant; the defendant is the one who chooses to assume a contractual
obligation. But standing focuses on the plaintiff.233 It asks whether the
plaintiff has suffered an injury warranting judicial redress.234 Voluntarily and involuntarily assumed legal obligations both create legal
rights in the plaintiff, and from the plaintiff’s point of view, the violation of any right harms the plaintiff.
Indeed, to the extent the voluntariness of an obligation should
matter to standing, most individuals may very well prefer a broader
229 The Supreme Court has claimed that there is no hierarchy of constitutional rights for
standing. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). But this argument—that standing should be at least as restrictive for
contract rights as it is for statutory rights—does not rest on the ground that statutory rights are
more important than contractual rights. Instead, it rests on the idea that separation of powers
more strongly supports creating an exception to standing for statutory rights than for contractual
rights.
230 35 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 194 (1925) (recounting Williston’s statement that he “[didn’t] see why a man should not be able to make himself
liable if he wishes to do so”).
231 Daniel Markovits, Theories of the Common Law of Contracts, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2019 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2015/entries/contracts-theories/ [https://perma.cc/TXH8-EFTB].
232 See Barnett, supra note 109, at 288.
233 See Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950–51 (2019). More
accurately, standing focuses on the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, an appellant must also establish standing before the court of appeals. Id. at 1951.
234 Id. at 1950–51.
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ability to sue for breaches of involuntarily imposed statutory duties
instead of for voluntary duties created by contract. Statutory rights
protect core individual interests—such as life, personal safety, and
property—that society has deemed so important that they should be
protected for everyone, regardless of whether each person has entered
into contracts to protect them.235 Presumably, most people would protect those interests by contract to the extent that they could if statutes
did not provide that protection.
Dispensing with the injury in fact requirement because contracts
are voluntary is also in tension with the doctrine that parties cannot
avoid standing through an agreement.236 Standing is a jurisdictional
requirement, and the law has long held that consent cannot confer
jurisdiction that is otherwise lacking.237 Relaxing standing for voluntarily assumed obligations undermines this limitation. Courts would
have broader jurisdiction simply because the parties agreed to assume
legal obligations.238
To be sure, the consent a defendant gives in a contract is not
aimed at conferring subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the contract.239 It is to establish substantive obligations and entitlements. Nevertheless, if standing is different for contract actions because contracts
are consensual, a defendant’s consent is the basis for permitting federal courts to hear contract claims without injury in fact.
C. Federalism
A third argument for dispensing with injury in fact for contract
actions rests on federalism. The theory is that most contract actions
involve state law, and more expansive standing would promote feder235 See POSNER, supra note 218, at 213–15, 260–62 (justifying tort doctrines on the ground
that they promote efficiency and avoid the transaction costs of contract).
236 Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) (“[I]t was the duty of the
Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent of parties could not give it.”); accord
Walker v. Taylor, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 64, 67 (1847).
237

See, e.g., Capron, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 127.

Of course, consent is the reason that contracts are binding. The obligations in a contract
are enforceable because parties voluntarily enter into them. See Gibbons v. United States, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 273 (1868) (“If the plaintiff’s consent was voluntary, then the contract to
which he assented was binding . . . .”); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175–76
(AM. L. INST. 1981) (contracts voidable if not voluntary). But that consent does not provide a
basis for expanding the power of the court to hear the claim.
238

239 Contracts regularly contain forum selection clauses that confer personal jurisdiction on
courts that would otherwise lack it. But parties cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction
through contract.
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alism by expanding the federal judiciary’s power to enforce state law.
This argument has at least four flaws.
First, permitting federal courts to hear state law actions does not
promote federalism. The core idea of federalism is that the federal
government has limited, enumerated powers and cannot exercise the
residual powers left to the states. Diversity jurisdiction is a departure
from this rule.240 Far from protecting states from federal interference,
diversity jurisdiction enables federal courts to exercise significant influence on state affairs by empowering the courts to hear issues of
state law.241 The Founders thought this federal jurisdiction was necessary despite the intrusion on states’ rights to maintain the rule of law
among the states.242
Second, even if the states desired federal enforcement of state
law, more expansive federal standing for contract actions would protect state interests only if the states themselves had broader standing
for contract actions. In that situation, the federal courts could enforce
contracts to the same degree as the states. But in states that have
more restrictive standing, expansive federal standing would be against
state interests—unless the federal courts followed state standing law
in those cases, a proposition that the Supreme Court has not addressed—because it would permit enforcement of state laws in situations that the states think they should not be enforced.243
Third, federal standing doctrine is not designed to protect federalism.244 The driving principle of standing is separation of powers.245
Standing seeks to determine which disputes the federal courts should
resolve and which disputes should be left to the federal political
240 Hessick, supra note 14, at 100 (“Diversity thus is a departure from the ordinary balance
of power between the state and federal governments.”).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REV. 417, 428 & n.70 (2013).
To be sure, currently no state has adopted a more restrictive standing test than the Article III
test. See Hessick, supra note 14, at 66–68 (discussing state standing requirements). But the point
is that the states could adopt more restrictive tests. Certainly, some states have adopted more
restrictive doctrines in other areas of justiciability. For example, although federal courts have
created an exception to mootness for issues that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,”
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1992) (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816
(1969)), Oregon has not recognized a comparable exception for its courts, Yancy v. Shatzer, 97
P.3d 1161, 1171 (Or. 2004).
244 Hessick, supra note 14 , at 100 (“Federal courts have not developed justiciability doctrines with an eye towards protecting state sovereignty.”).
245 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (“The law of Article III
standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013))).
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branches.246 To that end, the purpose of standing is to determine
whether the dispute is appropriate for judicial resolution or whether it
should instead be resolved politically.247 It does not sort cases based
on whether they involve matters of particular importance to the
states.248 Accordingly, the Court has applied the same standing requirements in a variety of suits that raise more significant state interests than contract disputes, such as challenges to state actions
implementing state law.249
Fourth, although state law controls most contract disputes, some
contracts involve important federal interests that are regulated by federal law.250 The same federalism concerns do not apply to those contracts. Those inapplicable concerns therefore do not support a blanket
rule for dispensing with injury in fact for contract actions.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

FOR

CONTRACT

AND

STANDING LAW

Federal standing to sue to bring a contract action should be at
least as stringent as standing to sue for statutory violations. Breaches
of contract do not automatically result in a factual injury any more
than a statutory violation does, and neither the history nor the separation-of-powers rationale underlying standing provides a basis for
treating contracts and statutes differently. Nor are there other sound
bases for relaxing the standing requirements for contracts. Accordingly, if Spokeo requires injury in fact to support standing to pursue
violations of statutory rights, it should likewise require injury in fact to
support standing for violations of contractual rights.
But requiring injury in fact to establish standing for breach of
contract has several undesirable effects. One is that it would impair
the freedom of contract. Although no longer a constitutionally pro246 Hessick, supra note 14, at 101 (arguing that standing “defin[es] which disputes the federal courts may resolve and which disputes should be left to the federal political branches”).
247 See id.
248 See id.; see also Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 435–48
(2013) (describing in detail how standing doctrine does not account for federalism interests);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 703, 707 (2013) (denying standing to sue to defend California law, despite explicit determination by California that the plaintiff had been authorized to
pursue the suit).
249 See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 168–71 (1997) (concluding
that a challenge to conclusions of state administrative determination was justiciable); Cleveland
Hous. Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co., 621 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding
standing to challenge state nuisance laws).
250 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing when federal common law applies).
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tected interest,251 freedom of contract continues to play a critically important role in society.252 Limiting standing to sue for breach of
contracts would undermine that freedom by restricting the enforceability of contracts in federal court. Individuals could not select federal courts in their contracts for breaches of provisions that do not
result in cognizable factual harms.
This limitation should apply to contracts containing provisions
analogous to statutory provisions whose violations do not support
standing. For example, if violations of statutory obligations to provide
notice to consumers or to follow procedures aimed at protecting data
privacy do not constitute injury in fact, breaches of contractual provisions prescribing comparable obligations likewise do not cause a factual injury. Victims of breaches accordingly should not be able to
pursue those claims in federal court.
By the same token, victims should not be able to enforce liquidated damages clauses prescribing damages for breaches of those contractual provisions. In Spokeo, the Court held that a statutory damage
provision—prescribing damages of up to $1,000 for a violation of the
procedures in FCRA253—did not supply an injury in fact necessary to
establish standing. Similar logic applies to liquidated damages clauses
in contracts. Those clauses prescribe a consequence for a breach; they
do not establish that the breach itself constitutes an injury.
Restricting freedom of contract by requiring injury in fact would
not just simply interfere with individual autonomy to designate the
forum in which contractual rights are enforced. It would also undermine economic efficiency. Some contracts include federal forum selection clauses254 because the federal procedure is more regimented than
the state ones,255 or because the attorneys are more familiar with fed251 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not
speak of freedom of contract.”).

See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
254 Although important, the point should not be overstated. Many forum selection clauses
designate a particular state in which suit must be brought but permit suit in state or federal
court. See John F. Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution
Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 327 (2019).
255 See S. Scott Bluestein, When Vacations Go Bad: The Stormy Seas of Vessel Passenger
Litigation, 30 SC LAW. 50, 52 (2018) (“[F]ederal court has stricter deadlines for the production of
expert reports, completing discovery, providing the court and opposing counsel with information
about the case and relevant case law, disclosure of documents related to the issues, discovery
limitations and responding to motions. Litigation in federal court does have some advantages
over state court, such as electronic filing of pleadings with the clerk of court, nationwide subpoena power, one judge deciding the issues in the case and date certain trial dates.”).
252
253
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eral procedures.256 Requiring factual injury would increase costs by
limiting the availability of those federal forums.257 Plaintiffs would
have the choice of resorting to their less preferred option of state
court, pursuing more costly extralegal relief, or possibly waiting until a
more significant breach with more costly consequences occurs.258
These concerns are not limited to the plaintiff. Defendants in
breach cases might prefer to be in federal court—be it because they
prefer federal procedures or because they believe the federal court is
more likely to resolve the dispute in their favor. But they would be
unable to remove otherwise removable cases involving breach if the
breach does not result in factual injury.
Another consequence of requiring injury in fact is that it would
undermine the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Most contract actions involve state law and accordingly can be in federal court only
through diversity jurisdiction—that is, only if the parties are citizens
of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.259
The primary reason for diversity jurisdiction is to provide federal
courts as an alternative forum to resolve state law claims free from the
bias that state courts might harbor against out-of-state litigants.260
Thus, when sitting in diversity, federal courts ordinarily do not apply
different substantive law than the state court would.261 Their function
is to interpret and enforce state law as a court of that state would.262
Their only function is to be “another court of the State”—just one
that is free from the potential bias a state court might have against out
of state litigants.263
Imposing an injury in fact requirement for standing in contract
actions would create disparity in the enforceability of contracts in
state court and federal court. State courts are not bound by federal
See id. (comparing federal and state procedures).
See Beasley v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 191 U.S. 492, 497 (1903) (“[A] man may make himself
answerable in damages for the happening or not happening of what event he likes.”).
258 See POSNER, supra note 218, at 117 (“The basic aim of contract law . . . is . . . to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and . . . obviate costly self-protective
measures.”).
259 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
260 See Hessick, supra note 14, at 82 (“Diversity jurisdiction empowered federal courts to
serve as neutral fora for the resolution of claims involving those litigants. That neutrality would
result in more just decisions; placate, to some degree, dissatisfied litigants who might otherwise
resort to extra-legal measures were they to lose at the hands of a biased state court; and facilitate
business . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
261 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
262 See id.; Hessick, supra note 14, at 59.
263 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945); Hessick, supra note 14, at 59–60.
256
257
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standing rules.264 Many states have adopted broader standing rules
than the Article III rule that applies to federal courts.265 They accordingly could opt to hear breach of contract actions that do not result in
an injury in fact. At the same time, federal courts could not hear those
claims. Although they are bound by state substantive law in suits
brought under diversity jurisdiction, federal courts apply federal
standing rules in those suits.266
This disparity between federal and state jurisdiction is particularly salient for contract disputes. According to Henry Friendly, the
main type of case posing the bias that diversity jurisdiction was meant
to avoid consisted of contracts disputes.267 The fear was that state
courts would unduly favor poor in-state debtors over out-of-state
creditors.268 Requiring injury in fact would almost certainly not affect
those types of disputes, because actions for debt involve financial
harms. But it would affect other types of contractual disputes that
raise the specter of bias. One can imagine a local state court unduly
favoring in-state consumers claiming a breach of a privacy provision
over an out-of-state service provider.
Of course, federal courts could avoid these unwelcome consequences simply by holding that breaches of contracts themselves constitute injuries in fact, even when the breach has no consequence
other than the fact of the breach. The Court often manipulates standing doctrine by stretching the concept of injury to find standing in
cases that it believes the federal judiciary should have the power to
adjudicate.269 One set of cases in which the Court has done so involves
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. For example, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,270 the Court held that a nonminority contractor had standing to challenge a government program that gave
264 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do
not apply to state courts . . . .”).
265 See Hessick, supra note 14, at 65–68 (showing that many states do not require injury in
fact but permit standing for violations of rights or for generalized grievances).
266 Id. at 75.
267 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 486–87 (1928).
268 Id.
269 Hessick, supra note 17, at 304 (“The Court has been hesitant to deny standing in cases
involving the violation of a right that the Court deems particularly important even when the
plaintiff has not suffered a perceptible injury.”). By the same token, courts have applied a more
stringent standing requirement in cases in which the plaintiff challenges government actions related to national security. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, for example, the Court
explicitly said the imminence requirement is particularly rigorous in suits challenging actions
implicating national security. See 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013).
270 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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preference to minority businesses, even though the plaintiff could not
prove that it would have received any contracts if race were not considered.271 According to the Court, the denial of the opportunity to
compete on an equal footing constituted an injury in fact, even though
the ability to compete on equal footing would not necessarily have
resulted in the award of the contract.272
Another set of cases in which the Court has effectively dispensed
with the injury in fact requirement involve criminal prosecutions. The
Court has never hinted that the United States lacks standing to prosecute violations of federal criminal law, even though the violations do
not cause any identifiable harm to the government.273 Following this
approach, the Court could simply deem breaches of contract to be
injuries in fact.
But this approach would create significant problems. The most
obvious is that it would open the Court up to criticisms. Critics would
likely point to the treatment of contracts as yet another example of
standing law being unprincipled and esoteric. Others would likely
claim that the Court is moving back in the direction of Lochner by
more highly protecting contract rights than statutory rights.
More tangibly, dispensing with injury in fact for contract actions
would have ripple effects throughout the law. Automatically recognizing standing for breach of contract actions would provide a means for
avoiding the injury in fact requirement in other types of cases. Injury
in fact would no longer be a threshold prerequisite to limit the power
of the federal judiciary;274 instead, it would become a default rule. Parties could circumvent standing limitations on statutory rights by entering into contracts imposing identical obligations.
Consider a statute requiring a doctor’s office to destroy data
about former patients two years after they stopped seeing the doctor.
Bob goes to Doctor Smith about a medical problem. Two years after
the visit, Doctor Smith does not destroy Bob’s personal data, in violaId. at 211–12.
Id. at 211; Hessick, supra note 17, at 306 (“[T]he Court has found standing based on
such abstract injuries as the loss of an opportunity to compete for a benefit that may have been
denied anyway . . . .”).
273 Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2239, 2245 (1999).
274 Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (“Article III standing
. . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches[ ] . . . by requiring plaintiffs . . . seeking compensatory relief [to] have ‘(1) suffered an
injury in fact . . . .’ ” (citations omitted) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016))).
271
272
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tion of the statute. That violation would not confer standing on Bob, if
the failure to destroy the data did not cause any additional harm to
him. But if the injury in fact requirement does not apply to contracts,
Bob could have avoided the standing bar by insisting when he first
saw Dr. Smith that his contract with the doctor include a provision
requiring the destruction of his personal data.
Of course, contract provides an imperfect way to circumvent limitations on standing for statutory violations. For individuals to establish
standing through contractual obligations that mirror statutory obligations, they must enter into the contract before the violation occurs.
Many individuals will not be in a position to contract ex ante. But
many others will be in a position to do so.
Potentially more important, dispensing with the injury in fact requirement for breach of contract could provide avenues for Congress
and state legislatures to circumvent Spokeo. Courts have long recognized that statutes can impose implied contracts on parties.275 Legislatures could rely on this mechanism to avoid the injury in fact
requirement by enacting legislation that framed legal obligations as
contracts. For example, instead of simply requiring companies to
adopt procedures to protect data, a statute could provide that, when a
company gathers information about a person, it enters into an implied
contract under which it is obliged to adopt procedures to protect the
information. Because the obligation derives from contract instead of
statute, a plaintiff claiming that a company did not maintain adequate
procedures would not have to demonstrate an injury in fact to have
standing.276 No doubt, to prevent Congress from circumventing
Spokeo in this way, the Court could proclaim that federal statutes that
create implied contracts are simply statutory rights, but it could not do
so with respect to state law statutes that imply contracts. States could
simply decree that, as a matter of state law, a state statutory obligation
275 See Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U.S. 602, 613 (1904) (“It is a liability created by the statute,
because the statute is the foundation for the implied contract . . . .”).
276 To be sure, historically, if an obligation arose from an implied promise imposed by law,
as opposed to from an express contract, the usual form of action was an action on the case, which
traditionally required proof of damages. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. But
the action on the case was not the exclusive form of action; it was only the usual form of action.
See id. Parties could opt instead to bring a standard assumpsit action to enforce the promise,
though it was not the usual avenue of relief. See Burnett v. Lynch (1832) 108 Eng. Rep. 220, 227
(KB) (Littledale, J.) (“[W]here from a given state of facts the law raises a legal obligation to do a
particular act, and there is a breach of that obligation, and a consequential damage, there, although assumpsit may be maintainable upon a promise implied by law to do the act, still an
action on the case founded in tort is the more proper form of action.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-2\GWN202.txt

344

unknown

Seq: 47

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9-MAR-21

15:49

[Vol. 89:298

constituted a contractual obligation—and federal courts would be
obliged to accept that construction.277
To be sure, one might say that requiring injury in fact for standing
to pursue breach of contract would result in a better allocation of resources. Litigation is expensive both for the litigants and for the judiciary. Refusing to grant standing for breaches of contract that result in
no factual injury would save resources for cases when something
“real” is at stake. But even if judges perceive that a breach of contract
does not result in harm, the victims of the breach may disagree. After
all, they considered the right important enough to include in the
contract.
Moreover, to the extent the federal judiciary faces the need to
conserve resources, Article III standing is not the appropriate vehicle
for achieving that goal. Article III does not limit the judicial power to
disputes involving significant stakes. It extends the judicial power to
all cases, irrespective of the amount at stake, that involve a federal
question or fall into one of the other eight enumerated categories.278 It
is for this reason that the Court has said that the judicial power extends to cases even when the matter at stake is a “trifle.”279 A more
effective way for courts to protect judicial resources is through prudential doctrines. These doctrines would give the courts the flexibility
to determine which disputes involve significant enough stakes to warrant the costs of judicial intervention.280 And even then, federal courts
are the wrong institution to determine how to allocate judicial resources. Congress has the responsibility for determining how to prioritize the expenditure of federal resources.281
In short, although it is tempting to craft ways around the holding
in Spokeo for contract disputes, doing so would be unprincipled and
could wreak havoc on the law. At the same time, applying the injury
in fact requirement to contract disputes also results in unpalatable
277 Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976)
(“We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [the State’s] law by the highest court
of the State.”).
278 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
279 United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601,
613 (1968)).
280 Hessick, supra note 14, at 98–99 (discussing the pragmatic values of considering resources limitations through prudential doctrines).
281 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (assigning the appropriations power to Congress); see Hessick, supra note 17, at 323 (“[Federal] courts are not the appropriate body to determine how to
allocate their resources—determining when resources should be spent on enforcement is a traditional function of Congress.”).
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consequences. This dilemma provides a compelling reason to think
that Spokeo was wrongly decided. Commentators have criticized
Spokeo on the grounds that it is unprincipled, conflicts with the original understanding of Article III, introduces undesirable normative
judgments into jurisdictional determinations, and unduly limits the
ability of individuals to secure remedies for the violation of their
rights.282 The troublesome consequences of applying Spokeo to contracts provide further, powerful ammunition against Spokeo.
CONCLUSION
The requirements for Article III standing should not be more relaxed in suits for breaches of contract than in suits for violations of
statutory rights. Both types of suits seek to do the same thing—enforce the rights and obligations created by legal instruments—and
nothing in the Constitution suggests that courts have less power to
enforce statutes than to enforce contracts.
The best way to achieve consistency in standing doctrine across
contract and statutory actions is to dispense with the injury in fact
requirement altogether. As many have argued, the requirement is
ahistorical and unprincipled, and it has led to incoherence in standing
law.283 No doubt, the Court may be reluctant to do away with the injury in fact requirement wholesale. Discarding that would not only
overturn Spokeo but also draw into question decades of cases suggesting that injury in fact is a prerequisite to standing. But the implications of extending the injury in fact requirement to contract cases
should nevertheless lead the Court to reconsider the requirement.
One might argue that reconciling standing for contract breaches
and statutory violations is not worth the effort because most breaches
of contract do result in factual injuries that would support standing.
282 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 384 (2018) (“One of the most important criticisms of standing doctrine is that it simply has no direct support in the Constitution . . . .”); Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 340 (2015) (criticizing the
use of standing to limit remedies); Hessick, supra note 17, at 276 (arguing that standing does not
follow history); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 486–88 (2008)
(criticizing standing doctrine’s effects on democracy and power dynamics); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2002) (arguing
that standing introduces normative judgments that favor the wealthy and privileged and unduly
limits the ability of individuals to secure remedies for the violation of their rights).
283 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 17, at 221 (“The structure of standing law in the federal
courts has long been criticized as incoherent.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1988) (criticizing standing as a
twentieth century invention).
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But even if breaches without injury are rare today, they may be more
common tomorrow. That is especially so given that it is likely that
people will increasingly enter into more contracts bearing on data
privacy.
Moreover, a paucity of cases in which a breach of contract was
not accompanied by a factual injury does not mean that courts should
ignore the problem. For one thing, the discrepancy between standing
for breaches of contract and violations of statutory rights creates unnecessary confusion and inconsistency in standing doctrine. As many
have noted, standing is already confusing and incoherent,284 and adding further complications would throw fuel on the fire. More important, broader standing for contract breaches than for statutory
violations undermines the core premise of standing. The central motivation for standing is separation of powers. Recognizing broader
standing for contracts than for statutes runs exactly counter to protection of separation of powers. It results in the courts giving higher priority to the wishes of private parties than to the wishes of Congress.
Accordingly, to resolve this dilemma and bring coherence to standing
doctrine, the Court should overturn Spokeo and eliminate the injury
in fact requirement.

284 For a criticism of standing, see Hessick, supra note 17, at 276; Susan Bandes, The Idea of
a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 227–29 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies,
and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1984);
Fletcher, supra note 17, at 220–24; Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel.
Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2001).
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